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Simultaneous bargaining over more issues by two bargainers  is treated by taking sums 
of bargaining games and requiring bargaining solutions to satisfy certain (super-)  additivity 
axioms. A (new) characterization  of  a family of so-called proportional solutions is given 
with  the aid of  three  axioms: (partial) superadditivity, homogeneity,  and  weak  Pareto 
optimality. Requiring, besides individual rationality and Pareto continuity, the axioms of 
restricted  additivitv,  scale  transformation  invariance.  and  Pareto  optimality,  yields  an 
alternative  characterization  of  a  family  of  solutions  consisting  of  all  nonsymmetric 
extensions  of  Nash's  solution. Also  these  solutions exhibit  a  (limited) proportionality 
property. Further, the relation with the Super-Additive solution of Perles and Maschler is 
discussed, and also the link with Myerson's results on proportional and utilitarian solutions. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
SUPPOSE, TWO  PARTIES  are facing several  (separate) bargaining  situations,  on 
(possibly quite) different issues. Handling these situations one by one may yield 
both  parties  only small profits.  Bargaining, however,  over these  issues  simul- 
taneously, may yield both parties larger total profits, thus reflecting more properly 
their perhaps  strong  interests  in  some of  these  issues. The following  simple 
example illustrates this. 
EXAMPLE 1.1:  Mr. X and his wife each have a ticket for a magnificent movie, 
but, unfortunately, these tickets are not valid for the same show. Now, for each 
of the two shows for which one of the tickets is valid, there are three alternatives: 
(a) the ticket-holder watches the movie leaving his/her partner at home, which 
gives him/her 6 units of utility and his/her partner -2  units: (b)  they both stay 
at home, but with the ticket-holder grudging the whole evening: 0 utility for both; 
(c)  they both stay at home and play some card-game: 0 utility for the ticket-holder 
and 1 unit of utility for the partner. If we suppose for a moment that these utilities 
are additive, then  Mr. X  as well  as his  wife  do very  well  by  each one using 
his/her ticket and receiving a net utility of 4. 
In this paper, we will follow the axiomatic approach to the bargaining problem 
as initiated  by  Nash  [12].  We restrict  our attention to two-person bargaining 
problems.  Simultaneous bargaining  over  more issues  will  be  reflected  in  our 
model by taking appropriate sums of bargaining games, and its possible advan- 
tages for the players by additivity axioms for bargaining solutions. 
Formally, a (two-person) bargaining game S is a proper subset of the plane 
satisfying: 
(1.1)  S is closed, convex and sup {x,;  x E S}E R for all i E {1,2}; 
(1.2)  0( =0,O))  E S and x >0 for some x E S; 
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(1.3)  S is comprehensive, i.e. for all x E S and y E  [W2,  if  y  x then y E S. 
Let B denote the family of all bargaining games. When interpreting an SE B, 
one must think of the following game situation. Two players  (bargainers) may 
cooperate and agree  on a feasible  outcome x in  S,  giving  utility  x,  to  player 
i = l,2, or they  may  fail  to  cooperate,  in  which  case  the  game  ends in  the 
disagreement outcome 0. So for any SE B,  the disagreement outcome is fixed at 
0 (which allows us to omit the usual axiom of translation invariance for bargaining 
solutions, which are defined below). Closedness of S is required for mathematical 
convenience; convexity stems from allowing lotteries in an underlying bargaining 
situation.  Further, it  is assumed that S is bounded  from  above, but not from 
below, since we allow free disposal of utility. The requirement  x>  0 for some 
x E Sserves to give each player an incentive to cooperate. Not all of the restrictions 
in 11.1)-(1.3) are necessary  for all of our results, but assuming thea simplifies 
matters and, moreover, none of them goes against intuition. 
A (two-person) bargaining solution is a map 4: B +  [W2  assigning to each SE B 
an outcome 4(S)  E S and such that Axiom 0 holds: 
AXIOM 0: 4(S)  depends only on  (the shape of)  S. 
Axiom 0 states explicitly that 4 does not depend on an underlying bargaining 
situation (i.e., a set of lotteries and a pair of utility functions mapping these into 
the  plane).  By  most  authors, this  is  implicitly  assumed  or taken  for granted 
(however, cf. Shapley [16]). We will explicitly use Axiom 0 in the next section. 
Before introducing some further axioms for bargaining solutions, we need  a 
few definitions and notations.  A scale transformation  a =(a,,  a,)  is a vector in 
[W:_  := jx E [W2;x >  0).  For  a E R:,,  x E [W2,  SE B,  ax := (a,x,, a2x2) and  as:= 
{ux;xES}.  For  ~ER,  a>O,  aS:=(a,a)S.  For  S,TEB,  S+T:= 
{x+y;x~S,y~ T}.  (Note that aS,S+T€B.) For SEB,  P(S):={x€S;  for all 
y E S, if  y 2x,  then y = x} denotes the Pareto optimal subset of  S, and  W(S)  := 
{xE S; for all y E  [W2,  if y >  X, then y & S)  denotes the weakly Pareto optimal subset 
of  s. 
Let  4: B +  [W2  be  a bargaining  solution. The f~llowing  axioms will  play  an 
important role. 
AXIOM 1 (Indiuidual Rationality, IR):4(S)  20 for all S E B. 
AXIOM 2 (Pareto Optimality, PO): 4(S) E P(S)for all SE  B. 
AXIOM 3 ( Weak Pareto Optimality, WPO): 4(S)  E  W(S)  for all SE B. 
AXIOM 4 (Scale Transformation  Invariance, STI):  d(aS)  = a4(S)  for a//  S E B, 
a E R:,. 
AXIOM 5 (Homogeneity, HOM): 4(aS)  = a4(S)for all SE B,  a E [W,  a >  0. 155  SIMULTANEITY  OF  ISSUES 
AXIOM 6 (Super-Additivity, SA):  4(S+  T) 2 (P(S)+ 4(T)  for all S, T E B. 
AXIOM 7 (Partial Super-Additivity,  PSAf: 4(S+  T)  2 (P(S), 4(S+  T)  4(T) 
for all S,  T E B. 
AXIOM 8 (Symmetry, SYM):  4i(S)  = &(S) for all SE B such that S= {(x,, x,); 
x = (x,, x,) E S). 
AXIOM 9 (Pareto Continuity,  PCO):  rb  is continuous on  (B, n)  where n is the 
metric on B de$ned  by  n(S, T)  = dH(P(S),F(T))and dH is the Hausdorff metric. 
Note that Axiom  3  is  implied by  Axiom 2,  5 by  4,  7  by  6 and 1. (The last 
implication is the reason why we use the expression partial SA rather than weak 
SA:  PSA  is  not  implied  by  SA  alone.)  Axiom  6,  super-additivity,  was  first 
formulated  by  Perles and Maschler [13].  Note also that the continuity axiom 
PC0 is weaker than the continuity axiom mostly used (see, e.g., Jansen and Tijs 
[5]). As far as needed, we will discuss all these axioms in due place. 
The main purpose of this paper is to find bargaining solutions which satisfy 
(partial) super-additivity. The following example is a translation of the example 
at the beginning of this section, with the extras of allowing randomization between 
alternatives  and using a bargaining solution. It indicates that it may indeed be 
advantageous for both players to bargain over more issues simultaneously. 
We adopt another notation: for a finite number of vzctors x', x2,.  . . ,x' in UX2, 
~(x', x2,.. . ,xl):= {yE w';  y s x for some x E conv {x', x2,.  . . ,xl}). 
EXAMPLE 1.2. (See Figure 1): Let 4:  B + UX2  be a bargaining solution satisfying 
IR,  WPO,  SYM. Then  4,(S((O,  I), (6, -2))) +  d,(S((l,  O),  (-2,6))) s  3  for  i E 
{1,2), whereas  4(S((O,  I), (6, -2)) +  S((1,  O),  (-2,6))) = (4,4). So it  is  clearly 
advantageous for both players to play both games simultaneously. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 tries to give a foundation 
to taking sums of bargaining games as a tool for handling simultaneous  bargaining 
over more than one issue, and pays due attention to the super-additive solution 
of Perles and Maschler [13].  In Section 3, a family of super-additive solutions 
is characterized. This family does not contain the Perles-Maschler  solution; it 
does, however, contain the so-called proportional solutions proposed by  Kalai 
[6]. The result of Section 3 might be regarded unsatisfactory in one specific sense: 
most of the solutions characterized there do not obey Axiom 4, scale transforma- 
tion  invariance.  As  a  possible remedy for this and an alternative, the super- 
additivity axiom is weakened in Section 4 to an axiom called restricted additivity, 
and this leads to a new characterization of a family containing the nonsymmetric 
Nash solutions (Nash [12],  Harsanyi and Selten [3]). The last result is closely 
related  to Aumann  [I] and Shapley [16].  Also  in  Section 4,  the link  of  the 
characterizations in  Sections 3 and 4 with  the paper of  Myerson [ll] will  be 
discussed. Section 5 concludes with a few final remarks. HANS  PETERS 
2.  TAKING  SUMS OF  BARGAINING  GAMES-THE  SUPER-ADDITIVE  SOLUTION  OF 
PERLES  AND MASCHLER 
Let  P  denote  some  Prospect  space  or  set  of  pure  (riskless)  alternatives, 
containing  a  disagreement alternative p E P,  and let 9 denote an appropriate 
mixture set of lotteries on P. Suppose there are two bargainers, 1 and 2, with 
von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility functions ui (i  =1,2) defined on 9,such that 
ui(p)=0. If P is large enough (e.g. P =R'),  then we can view every bargaining 
game S in B as S={(ul(l),u2(1));1E2')where 2'  is the mixture set of lotteries 
corresponding to some subset L cP with p  E L. Suppose now, the two bargainers 
are  faced  with  two  bargaining  games  S and  T  in  B,  with  S as  above and 
T ={(ul(m),  u2(m));  m EA}where A is the mixture set of lotteries corresponding 
to some M c P with p E  M.  Simultaneous bargaining over more issues means in 
this  case: bargaining  over  the  product  set  of  lotteries  2'  x A ={(I, m);  1  E2, 
m E A).  Of  course,  we  assume that both bargainers have preferences  also on 
2'  x A, which are represented by utility functions wi(i =1,2). 
In order to use sums of bargaining game? as representing simultaneous bargain- 
ing, we would like to have S+ T ={(wl(l,  m), w2(1, m)); (1, m) E 2'x A}and this 
is true if we have, for i =1,2, w'(1, m) =ui(l)+  ui(m)  for all (I, m)  E 2x  A. The 
obvious question then is: when, i.e. under which conditions on the bargainers' 
underlying  preferences,  does w'  have this additivity property? This question is 
answered in detail in Peters [14]. There, it is shown that, besides some normaliz- 
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an axiom of weak monotonicity and an axiom of additive independence. The latter 
axiom can also be found in Fishburn [2] or Keeney and Raiffa [8, p. 2311, and 
requires that player i be indifferent between the lottery which gives him (I, m) 
and (If,  m') both with probability i, and the lottery which gives him (I, m')and 
(Ir,  m) both with probability :,  for all I,  I'E 9and m, m'~ A. For further details 
see Peters [14].  In the above argument, we have viewed every bargaining game 
S as arising from a subset of a large set of alternatives (P),  the bargainers' utility 
functions being the restrictions of their utility functions on the lottery set of this 
large set. Although we think this is a natural approach, one might still argue that 
bargaining  solutions  are supposed to be defined on bargaining games  arising 
from all  possible  kinds of  situations. At  this  point,  Axiom  0  comes into the 
picture:  once  the  image  of  a  bargaining  situation  in  utility  space  (i.e., the 
bargaining game itself) is known, the underlying bargaining situation becomes 
irrelevant with respect to determination of the solution outcome. 
We will now shortly review the model of Perles and Maschler [13] and compare 
it with our present model. We will describe their results using our  own framework. 
Let  B":= {SEB; x 2 0  for all  x E P(S)}. Perles  and Maschler prove that there 
exists a unique solution PM  on the proper subset B'  of B (the so-called super- 
additive solution) satisfying the Axioms IR, PO, STI, SA, SYM, PCO. (Perles 
and Maschler do not need the individual rationality axiom, since they restrict 
every bargaining game to the positive orthant of the plane.) Dropping SYM gives 
a two-parameter family of nonsymmetric super-additive solutions. We omit for- 
mulas here. Perles and Maschler justify their super-additive solution (or, more 
specifically, the SA axiom) by the following observation which we copy almost 
exactly within our own model. 
OBSERVATION  be a solution satisfying SA and HOM. For  2.1:  Let 4:  B-[w' 
any game consisting of a lottery on two games R and S in B,  players who obey 
4 will  both prefer to reach an agreement before the outcome of the lottery is 
available. 
PROOF: Let (p, 1 -p) be the distribution of the lottery, w.1.o.g. O<p < 1. If the 
players  reach  an  agreement  immediately,  it  must  be  4(T), where  T= 
pR+(l-p)S.  By  HOM and SA, 
The right-hand side of (2.1) is the expectation  of  the players from a  delayed 
agreement.  Q.E.D. 
Thus, Observation  2.1  provides  a  different  justification  for the  SA  axiom. 
Another important difference between the present model and the model of Perles 
and Maschler is that their solution is restricted to the class B0 where no player 
has an incentive to commit himself to a feasible outcome which is not individually 
rational for the other player. Indeed, if one feels that one is actually dealing with 
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this restriction to B@is justified. Recall Example 1.2.The outcome of the sumgame, 
(4,4), can only be achieved by the sum (6,  -2) +(-2,6). This means that in one 
game player 1 can commit himself to (6,-2), whereas in the other game player 
2 can commit himself to (-2,6). In a noncooperative setting, such commitments 
would be impossible: we are stuck in a prisoner's di!emma.  Yet in a cooperative 
setting, where binding agreements are possible, these commitments lead to a net 
utility profit of 4 for both players. We will assume such a cooperative setting and 
our main purpose will be to find super-additive solutions defined on B. 
Perles  and Maschler have  already  indicated  that their  solution  cannot be 
extended to B. This will also follow as a corollary of the results in the next section. 
3. A  FAMILY OF SUPER-ADDITIVE SOLUTIONS 
In this section we single out a family of super-additive solutions with the aid 
of the (weak, odd-numbered) axioms WPO, HOM, and PSA. So we considerably 
weaken the Perles-Maschler  list of axioms in order to avoid an impossibility 
result. As already remarked before, in Section 1,for  individually rational solutions 
the partial super-additivity axiom follows from super-additivity; it states that in 
the simultaneous bargaining game, each player should get a:  least what he can 
get  in  each of  the composing  bargaining  games separately.  We  start  with  a 
definition and the main results, and defer discussion to the end of this section. 
DEFINITION  1, the bargaining  3.1:  For every p E R2 with p 30  and p, +p, = 
solution EP:B +R2is defined by 
{EP(S)) = W(S) n{cup; a E R, cu >  0)  for all SE  B. 
EP  is called the egalitarian  or proportional  solution  with weight  vector p. 
For strictly positive  weight vectors, these proportional solutions were intro- 
duced in Kalai [6]. Our main result is the following theorem. 
THEOREM 3.2: Let 4:B +R2  be a bargaining solution.  Then 4 satisjes  @'PO, 
HOM, PSA if  and only if it is proportional. 
The proof of this theorem will  make use of the following three lemmas. In 
every one of these lemmas, 4 is a bargaining solution satisfying the three axioms 
of the theorem. 
LEMMA 3.3:  Let SE  B and r~ R',,.  Then (i)  ifr  E int(S),  then 4(S)  3 4(S(r)); 
(ii)  4(S(R)) 3 0. 
PROOF: (i) Suppose r E int (S).Then 4(S)3 4(S(r)), in view of PSA and th.e 
fact  that  S = S(r)+ T  where  T:= {x-r; x E  S)E B.  (ii)  Suppose 4,(S(r))<0. 
Then, by HOM, 4J:S(r))=:&(S(r))> &(S(r))which contradicts (i). Similarly, 
the assumption 4,(S(r)) <0 leads to a contradiction. Hence 4(S(r)) 30. 
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In particular, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 
COROLLARY 3.4:  Every  homogeneous  and  partially  super-additive  bargaining 
solution is individually rational. 
PROOF: Follows from the observation that we did not use WPO in the proof 
of Lemma 3.3.  Q.E.D. 
Henceforth, we may assume that 4 is also individually rational. Let now L be 
the set ip  E R:+;  +P2 = 11. 
LEMMA 3.5:  Either  (i)  4(S(p))  =p  for  some p  E  L, or (ii)  4,(S(p))  <p2  for  all 
p E L, or  (iii)  4,(S(p))  <  p, for  all p E L. 
PROOF:  Suppose  (i) does  not  L':= {p~  hold.  Let  L;  4,(S(p))<pl},  E':= 
{p E  L; &(S( p)) <  p2},and suppose that LL# m, L'  # 0.Let  E  L', P'  E  L'.  We 
show 
Suppose (3.1)does not hold, i.e. pi <p: and p:>  p:.  Let then q E R:+  be defined 
by  q,:= ;(P:  + 4,(s(pk))),  q2:=  $(P:+ +,(s(~*))).q E int sip1),  by Then  so 
Lemma 3.3(i),  4,(S(pk))  3 dl(S(y)). Similarly, gb2(S(p2)) 2  #9(S(q)). Altogether 
we obtain q > 4(S(q)), in contradiction with WPO. So (3.1)must hold. 
From (3.1)and our assumption that (i) does not hold, we conclude that there 
exists ii E  L such that for all p E L with pl <  pl  we have p E  L2,and for all p E  L 
with p, >  p, we have p E  L1.'The proof of the lemma is finished, by contradiction, 
if we show 
Suppose  (3.2) does  not  hold,  w.1.o.p.  suppose p~  L'.  Let  a>1  such  that 
a+,(S(p)) +  (~4~(S(p)) = 1, and let p*  E L be defined by p* := $(p+  a4(S(p))). 
Take P  E  (0,1)  such that for r:= pp*  we have r,>  4,(S(p)),  r, <  d,(S(p)). Since 
pT  >  p,, we have p*  E  LL, hence &(S(p*))=  p:.  By HOM, &(S(r))= r,.  However, 
r E int S(p)  so that 4(S(p)) 2  4(S(r)) by  Lemma 3.3(i),in contradiction with 
4,(S(r))= r2> &(S(p)).  So (3.2)must hold.  Q.E.D. 
Next, let p E  L with  &(S(p)) =p  if (i) in the above lemma holds, let p = (0,1) 
if  (iii), and let p =  (1,O) if  (ii). 
LEMMA 3.6.  For all SE  A,  4(S)= EP(S). 
PROOF:  Let  SEB.  First  suppose  EP(S) E  P(S).  If  p>O,  4(S)2 
4(S((l-  e)EP(S)))  = (1-e)EP(S) for 1>  E >  0,by Lemma 3.3(i)and HOM, so 
we are done by letting  E  go to 0. If p = (1, 0),then take a sequence rl,  r2,.  . . in 
int (S)~R:, converging  to  EP(S).Then  again  +(S)2  4(S(rf))  for  each  i = 
1,2,. . . ,so cb1(S) 2  @'(S(r1)) = ri for each i = 1,2,. . . ,  hence 4,(S)3  E?(S).We 
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Suppose now that EP(S)  Ff P(S).  W.1.o.g. (the other case is similar) there exists 
x E P(S)  with  x, = Ey(S).  Given  E >  0,  let  RE E B  be  defined  by  R'  := 
S((E,  EP(S) -xz),  (0, E)).  Let  T' = S+R'  (cf. Figure  2). Note that  EP(T')  E 
P(TC).  By the first part of the proof, $(TL)  = EP(T").  If  E  goes to 0, EP(T')  = 
4(T') converges to EP(S),  and  by PSA, $( TF)2 $(S) for all E, so EP(S)  3 $(S). 
If p = (1,O) the proof is finished. If p >  0, then also the proof is finished, noting 
that 4(S)  3 EP(S)  by the argument in the third sentence of the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
An  immediate consequence of  Lemma 3.6 is  that, if  4(S(p))  =p  for some 
p~  L, then this p is unique. The proof of Theorem 3.2 is now straightforward. 
PROOFOF THEOREM 3.2:  If 4 satisfies the three axioms of the theorem, then 
4 is proportional in view of Lemma 3.6 and it is straightforward to verify that 
a proportional solution satisfies these axioms.  Q.E.D. 
We first  remark that the proof of Theorem 3.2 could have been shorter had 
we added some continuity  axiom (e.g. PCO) to our list of axioms.  Doing so, 
however, we would have hidden the fact that such an axiom is not necessary 
here, whereas it  is  in the main result of the next section (Theorem 4.9). Note 
further that, apart from partial superadditivity, we need only two relatively weak 
axioms (WPO and HOM) to single out the family of proportional solutions in 
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by PSA  and HOM. (If this had not been the case, we would have required it, 
since IR is indisputable as an axiom.) 
Finally, it can be easily seen that PSA is implied by SA and IR  combined, and 
that SA is implied by the combination of PSA, WPO, and HOM (since every 
proportional solution is super-additive). So  the following corollary is immediate. 
COROLLARY 3.7:  Let  4:  B+ R'  be a  bargaining  solution.  Then 4 satisjes the 
axioms WPO, HOM, IR, and SA if and only if it is proportional. 
Recall that a super-additive solution (in the sense of Perles and Maschler [13]) 
is a solution satisfying IR, PO, STI, PCO, SA, SYM. 
COROLLARY  There does not exist a super-additive solution: B +[w~. 3.8: 
PROOF: In view of Corollary 3.7, the only candidate for such a solution would 
be EP  with p = ($, $), but this solutidn satisfies neither PO nor STI.  Q.E.D. 
Since von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are being assumed, one  may 
find it a drawback for a solution not to satisfy the scale transformation invariance 
axiom, since this implies that utilities (of different players) are being compared. 
However, arguments can be given against this objection. For more discussion, 
we refer to Shapley [16],  Kalai [6],  and Myerson [lo]; and to the final section 
of the present paper. 
There are only two scale transformation invariant proportional solutions: this 
observation leads to the following corollary immediately. 
COROLLARY  The only two solutions satisfying  WPO, STI, IR, and SA, are 3.9: 
the proportional  solutions E "J' and E ",". 
Since these two "tyrannical"  solutions are very unlikely to describe an actual 
bargaining process satisfyingly, we might view Corollary 3.9 as an impossibility 
result. In the next section, we will considerably weaken the super-additivity axiom 
to obtain an alternative characterization of a well-known family of solutions, the 
non-symmetric Nash solutions. 
4.  SOLUTIONS WITH  THE RESTRICTED ADDITIVITY  AXIOM 
In this section, we will  describe a  family of scale transformation invariant 
bargaining solutions satisfying the following axiom, where we ca!l  an SE B smooth 
at x E S if  there exists  a  unique line of support of S at x, and where 4  is  a 
bargaining solution. 
AXIOM 10  (Restricted Additivity,  RA):  For  all  S and  T in  B,  if  S and  T are 
smooth at 4(S)  and 4(T)  respectively, and 4(S)+ +(T)  E P(S  + T), then 4(S+ 
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Axiom 10 is a slightly different version of the Conditional Additivity axiom in 
Aumann [I]. We defer most of the discussion and due references to the end of 
this section, and start with definitions and results. 
DEFINITION 4.1:  For  every  q E (0, I), the  bargaining  solution  Fq:  B +IW* is 
defined by: for every SEB, Fq(S)  (uniquely) maximizes the product  XYX:-~  on 
S~R:,.  The "dictator"  solutions Dl and D~ are defined by: for every SEB, 
D1(S)  is the point in {x  E P(S);  x 30) with maximal ith coordinate, for i = 1,2. 
The solution F'"  is Nash's solution (Nash  [12]) and the solutions Fq(q  E (0,l)) 
were derived in Harsanyi and Selten [3].  All solutions in Definition  4.1  satisfy 
the following axiom (cf. Nash [12]). 
AXIOM 11 (Independence of  Irrelevant  Alternatives,  IIA): For every S and T 
such that Sc T and 4(  T)  E S, we  have 4(S)  = 4(T). 
Axiom  11 has been amply discussed elsewhere (see Roth [15] for discussions 
and references). In de Koster, Peters, Tijs, and Wakker [9] the following resu!t 
was proved. 
THEOREM 4.2:  A bargaining solution 4 satisjies IR, PO,  STI, and IIA if  and 
only if  it is an element of  {Fq,  Dl, D~;  q E (0, 1)). 
Our main result in this section will be that, in Theorem 4.2, IIA can be replaced 
by  restricted  additivity  and Pareto  continuity.  First, we  have to do some pre- 
liminary work. The following lemma gives a geometric characterization of the 
solutions Fq(O  <q < 1).  The proof can be given by using a separating hyperplane 
theorem and is left to the reader. 
LEMMA 4.3:  For every SE B, Fq(S)  = z ( E P(S))  iff  there exists a line of  support 
of  S at z  with a normal vector (qz,, (1 -q)z,). 
The following tool will also be of use. 
LEMMA^.^:  Lets, TEB, andz=x+y~P(S+T)  wherex~S,y~T  Then we 
have (i) x E P(S), y E P(T), (ii) if  1 is a line of  support of  S+  T at z,  then there 
exist lines of  support I'  and 1"  of  Sand Tat  x and y respectively, such that I,  I'  and 
I"  are parallel,  (iii) ifS and Tare smooth at x and y  respectively,  then  1,  1'  and 1" 
in  (ii) are unique (and S+  T is smooth at z). 
PROOF:  (i) is straightforward by definition, and (iii) by (ii). To prove (ii), let 
1 be  such  a  line  with  a  normal  vector  A,  then  A 2 0,  and the  inner  product 
A.z=max{A.(s+t);s~S,  t~T)=max{A.s;  s~S)+max{A-t;  ~ET),  hence 
A. x =max {A. s;  s E S)  and  A -y =max {A  t; t E T),  from  which  (ii)  follows 
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PROPOSITION 4.5:  Let +  E {Fq,  DL,  D2;  q E (0,1)). Then + satisjies  the axioms 
IR, PO, STI, PCO, and RA. 
PROOF: We  only  prove  that  every  + E {Fq,  D1,  D2; q E (0,l))satisfies  the 
restricted additivity axiom. First, let + = Fqfor some q E (0,1). Let S, T  E B such 
that S and T are smooth at x := FYS)  and y := Fq(T) respectively, and x+  y E 
P(S+  T).  From  Lemma 4.4(iii) it follows that there exists a vector  A 20  such 
that A.x=max{A.s; SES} and A.y=max{A-t; t~  T),  A.(x+y)=max{A-v; 
v E S+  TI. From Lemma 4.3, it follows that x =  yv for some y >  0,hence x+  y = 
(1+  y)y. Applying Lemma 4.3 again, it follows that Fq(S+ T)= x+  y. 
Secondly, let  + = D', and S  and  T  in B such that S  and  T  are smooth at 
DL(S)and  DL( T),  respectively,  and  DL(S) + D'(T)E P(S+  T). If  D:(S)= 
D:(T)-0, then  D~(S)  =  0, and  so  D'(S+ T)=  + D1(  T)  since +  D:( T)  DL(S) 
DL(S) + D1(T) E  P(S+  T).  Otherwise, in view of Lemma 4.4(iii), the unique lines 
of support of S, T  and S + T at DL(S), DL(  T),  and DL(S) + DL(  T)  are the straight 
lines  with  equations  x,= D:(s), xl = Di(T),and x,= D:(S)+  D;(T),  respec-
tively. So D'(S+  T)  = D1(S)+ D'(T)since DL(S)+ D'(T)E P(S+  T). 
The third case, + = D2,is similar to the second one.  Q.E.D. 
Before proving the converse of the previous proposition, we need two more 
lemmas. 
LEMMA 4.6:  Let  4 be  a  bargaining solution  satisfying  IR, PO,  and  PCO.  Let 
SEB such  that S is smooth everywhere  (i.e.  at every point  of P(S))and such that 
the line of support of S at 4(S)has a normal vector with one coordinate equal to 
0. Let z E  P(S),z # +(S).Then there exists an everywhere smooth StE  B with S'c  S 
and z E S' such  that 4(S1) # z and such that the line of support of S' at 4(S1) has 
a strictly positive  normal vector. 
PROOF:  First note that +(S)= D1(S) or +(S)= D2(S). Assume 4(S) = D'(s) 
(the other case is similar). If 4,(S) =  0,then an S' as in the lemma can easily be 
found by  cutting off  a suitable neighborhood  of  +(S)in  S  in a smooth way. 
Suppose now, that  #,(S)>  0.  First,  choose  .?  E P(S)  with  +,(S)> .f,>  z, and 
such that  +,(T)>  zz where  T  consists of  all points of S  except those strictly 
above the straight line through .f  and b(S).Such a point .f  exists in view  of 
PCO. We  are done if  4(T) # +(S)for then we  can take, for Sf,the game  T 
smoothed off  at +(S)and 2,in view of PCO. Now suppose +(T) = +(S).For 
every  E  with 0s F c dI(S), let SE E B be the game consisting of all points of S 
except those strictly above the straight line through .?  and the point (4,(S)- F, 
+,(S)).Note  that  SO = T, so 4(So) = +(T) = +(S)= D*(s)= D2(S0). Now  let 
F := sup  {E  E LO,  d,(S)];  +(SF)  = D2(sE)}. By  PCO, +(SF) = D2(SF). If F = &(S), 
then we are back in the case of the first paragraph of the proof (where  we assumed 
4,(S) = 0). Otherwise,  0  F r+,(S).Then  take  7 with  F <  7<  +,(S)  small 
enough such that (D:(s")>  )+*(S") > z2.And take for S' the game S"  smoothed 
off  at D'(sT)and 2.  Q.E.D. 164  HANS  PETERS 
Let d  E B be defined by d := S((1, O), (0,1)) 
LEMMA 4.7:  Let 4 be a  bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, STI, PCO, and 
RA. Let p  E {Fq,D1,  D2;  q E  (0,1))  be such that 4(d)  = p(d).  Let  TE  B be such 
that  P( T)  3  cont. {v,w} where  v, w  E  IW~satisff  ul+ v2= w,+ w,= a >  0, vl >  0, 
w2>0,  t.,iO,  wl<O. Then 4(TI=p(T). 
PROOF:(See Figure 3.) By  STI, 4(Sd)  = p(6A)  for every  S  E  (0,a). Fix 6 E 
(0,  a).  Fix s <  min {t.,-6, w2 -d, -v,,  -w,}.Let D E  B be given by the following 
constraints: 
{x E  W(D); x,s 0)= {(x, +  E,  x2 -6- E); x E W(T),  xl  G -E), 
{XE  W(D);x~0)={x~O;x1+x2=a-61, 
Let E E B be given by E := S((6+  E,  -s), (-s, 6+  E)).  Then E T D = T. Note that 
E  and D  are smooth at every x E {eE P(E);  e  3 0) and y  E {dE P(D);  d  301, 
and that all supporting lines at these points are parallel, with  a normal vector 
A = (1,l). In particular, x +  y E  P(T)for every x E {eE P(e);  e  30},  y  E {dE P(D); 
d  20).  So by  PO,  IR, and RA,  4(T)=  4(D)+4(E),  hence  4,(E)G  4,(T)S 
4,(E)+a-6 and 42(E)~42(T)~47(E)+a-6.  E Letting  go to 0  gives,  by 
PC0 and the fact that 4(6A)= p(6d), 
Letting 6 go to a,  gives  4(T) = p(ad),  hence 4(T) = p(T)  since by definition 
of p, p(ffJ)=p(T).  Q.E.  D. 
PROPOSITION  Let 4 be a  bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, STI, PCO,  4.8: 
and RA. Let p := 41(d).  Ifp  # O,1, then 4 = FP;  ifp  = 1, then 4 = Dl  and fp  = 0, 
then 4 = D2. 
PROOF:(Figure 4.)  Let  p  E {F" Dl, D2;  0  <  q< 1) be the solution such that 
pl(J) = 41(A) =p.  Suppose there exists an S E B such that 
By  PC0 of 4  and p,  we  may suppose that S  is  smooth everywhere, and by 
Lemma 4.6, that the line of support of  S  at 4(S)has a strictly positive normal 
vector  A.  By  STI, we may further suppose that A  = (1,l)and 4,(S)+  4,(S)  = 1. 
Then we have, by Lemma 4.3, 
Let  T:=  S((3,  -2), (-2,3)):  then, by Lemma 4.7 and p(T)= (p,1-p), we have 
(4.3)  4(T) = (p,1 -p). 

Further, ST1 and Lemma 4.7 applied to S+ T, give 
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On the other hand, since S  is  smooth at  4(S),T is  smooth at (p,1 -p), and 
4(S) +(p,1 -p)  E P(S+  T),  we have by RA and (4.3) 
Combining (4.4) and (4.5) gives  4(S)= (p,1 -p), in  contradiction  with  (4.2). 
Hence (4.1)must be false, so 4(S)= p(S)  for all S E B.  Q.E.D. 
Propositions 4.5  and 4.8 lead immediately to Theorem 4.9. 
THEOREM  D'; q E (0,1)) is the family  of all bargaining solutions  4.9: {Fq,D1, 
B -+  R2  satisJ:ving IR, PO, STI, PCO, and RA. 
The following example shows that we cannot dispense with the PC0 Axiom 
in Theorem 4.9. 
EXAMPLE 4.10: We  construct a solution 4:B+ [w~ by  first  defining it  for all 
games S  which satisfy, for i = l,2: 
By applying the appropriate scale transformations, the definition is then extended 
to  B,  guaranteeing that 4 satisfies STI. So let S E B such that  S  satisfies (4.6). 
We define 4(S) as follows. If S  is smooth at F'  '(S),then 4(S):=F'"(s).  If S 
is not smooth at F'"(s),  then also 4(S) := F'"(s)  except for the case that there 
exists exactly one other point x E P(S)n  such that S  is not smooth at x;  in 
that case, 4(S) :=x. HANS PETERS 
It  is  straightforward  to verify that this 4, besides  STI, satisfies  IR, PO, and 
RA, but not PCO. 
Theorem 4.9 is the main result of this section. At first sight, the weakening of 
super-additivity to restricted addivity  may seem somewhat arbitrary, but if  we 
look closer, there is a strong link between the results in this section and those in 
the previous one. Of course, super-additivity implies restricted additivity. Every 
proportional solution satisfies  IR, PCO, and RA. The solutions E"."  and E"~" 
satisfy also WPO and STI. For a solution 4 and S, T  E B, say that RA applies to 
4,  Sand T if S and T are smooth at 4jS)and #(T)respectively, #(S)+4(T) E 
P(S+  T)  and 4(S)+4(T) = 4(S+  T).  Then, as an immediate consequence of 
Lemmas  4.3  and 4.4,  for  all  q E (0,I), if  RA applies  to  Fq, S, and  T, then 
Fq(S) = EP(S),  Fq(T)  = EP(T),and  FY(S+  T)  = EP(S+  T)  for  some  p >0. 
(With a few modifications, also a reversal of this statement holds.) So the restricted 
additivity axiom entails a kind of restricted proportionality property (not for the 
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The  results  in  this  section  are closely  related  to Aumann's  [I], where  an 
axiomatic  foundation  to  the  so-called  nontransferable  utility  value  is  given 
(Shapley [16]). Aumann uses a conditional additivity axiom, which is stronger 
than  restricted  additivity,  in  that  it  does not  require  smoothness.  However, 
Aumann restricts attention to smooth games, where here we have essentially the 
Pareto continuity axiom to take care of nonsmoothness. The present paper also 
covers the nonsymmetric (and nonstrongly  individually rational) case, and fur- 
ther, we note that (at least for strongly individually rational solutions) Theorem 
4.9 may be extended to characterize solutions for n-person games (that is, pure 
bargaining games, where only one-player coalitions and the all-player coalition 
are allowed) without difficulty. 
The smoothness condition in the definition of RA may be interpreted as "local 
transferable utility"  (Aumann [I, p.  141). It cannot be dispensed with: see the 
example in Aumann [I] or the following one. 
EXAMPLE 4.10:  Let  4 = F' ' be  the  (symmetric)  Nash  solution,  take  A  as 
before, and S:= S((2,  I)).  Then 4(A +S)  =(2,2)  # ($,+)+(2, 1) = +(A)  +  +(S)  E 
P(A +S). Here A  is smooth at +(A), but S is not smooth at 4(S).  (See Figure 5.) 
We end this section by discussing the relation of the results in Sections 3 and 
4 with Myerson's in [ll]. Myerson considers the effect of timing in social choice, 
so essentially justifies  his approach by  Observation 2.1,  but unlike Perles and 
Maschler in [13] does not restrict the domain of (in Myerson's case: social choice) 
problems. His main result  (described within  our model) reads: if  a bargaining 
solution 4 satisfies SA, WPO, and IIA, then it is either proportional or utilitarian. 
(By the way, Myerson overlooks here the solutions E''.~' and E",".)  Here 4 is 
called utilitarian if there exists some weight vector p  (i.e. p 30, p,+p, = 1) such 
that, for every  SEB,  +(S) is a maximizer of p.x where x E S.  Apart from the 
difference in  interpretation-simultaneous  bargaining  over more issues versus 
timing effect-the  main difference between  our results and those in [ll] is the 
fact that we do not need the IIA axiom as a condition. Parenthetically, note that 
a utilitarian solution is not completely determined by the definition above. Yet 168  HANS PETERS 
the following observation which links the nonsymmetric Nash solutions to the 
utilitarian solutions, holds: for all q E (0. I), if  RA applies to Fq,  S, and T, then, 
as before Fq(S)  = EP(S),  Fq(T)  = EP(T),  and Fq(S+  T)  = EP(S+  T) for some 
p >0, and these equalities still hold if  we substitute for EP  a utilitarian solution 
with weight vector A //A 1 1 '  where A = (qp?  (1-q)p?pyq).  This observation 
again follows simply from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4. It re-establishes the fact that a 
Nash  solution  offers  a  compromise  between  egalitarian  (proportional) and 
utilitarian principles. 
5.  FINAL REMARKS 
We set out, in the present paper, with the problem of simultaneous bargaining 
over more issues, and have tried to tackle the problem via an axiomatic treatment 
involving sums of bargaining games and (super-)  additivity axioms for bargaining 
solutions. By  these means, we have characterized different families of solutions 
for the two-person problem, in  Sections 3 and 4. The super-additive solution of 
Perles and Maschler [13] vanishes from the scene since, for our purposes,  its 
domain is too restrictive. In Section 3, we have characterized Kalai's (extended) 
family of proportional solutions, in Section 4 Harsanyi and Selten's (extended) 
family of nonsymmetric Nash solutions, by means of additivity axioms. A con- 
clusion  of  Section 3 is  that, together with  a few standard axioms, the super- 
additivity  axiom only allows "tyranical"  solutions if  comparisons between  the 
players'  utilities  are forbidden; in  Section  4,  we  have  considered  the weaker 
restricted additivity axiom. One general conclusion from the present results may 
be that (super)-additivity more or less implies proportionality,  i.e. implies to a 
greater or smaller extent a comparison between the players' utilities. 
In  the  previous  section,  we  indicated  one possible  extension  to  n-person 
bargaining games. It is also of interest to look for extensions to the general case 
of n-person games without side payments. Contributions in this area are, besides 
the already mentioned paper by Aumann [I], a paper by  Hart [4] and a paper 
by  Kalai and Samet 171, the former one showing results closely  related  to the 
ones obtained by Aumann, the latter one extending, axiomatically, the family of 
proportional  solutions. 
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